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Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count : what do 
wealth-effects tell us in Africa?
Abstract: Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there 
different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth 
effects  play-out  when  existing  corruption-control  levels  matter  in  the  corruption  battle?  To 
investigate  these concerns we examine the determinants  of corruption-control throughout the 
conditional  distribution  of  the  fight  against  corruption.  The  following  broad  findings  are 
established. (1) Population growth is a (an) tool (impediment) in (to) the fight against corruption 
in Low (Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in 
Middle (Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies 
are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with  different income-levels and  political wills 
in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on 
the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.
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JEL Classification: C10, H10, K10, O10, O55
1. Introduction
There is growing attention in the realization among international development experts 
that development requires above all, governance quality (Kaliannan et al., 2010; Rasiah, 2011; 
Katz & Iizuka, 2011). Over the past decades, the issue of corruption and the search for strategies 
to fight  its corrosive effects have grown in importance as a topic of public debate and a criterion 
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by  which  civil  society  scrutinizes  leadership.  Advice  on  sound  policies,  well  intentioned 
incentives and aid efforts may not achieve their desired objectives unless they are offered in an 
environment which stimulates self-sustaining growth and development (Jain, 2001). There is also 
growing  realization  that  unsustainable  policies  do  not  always  emerge  from a  deficiency  in 
knowledge about what best policies should be. Rather they could emanate just as much from 
decision  makers  distorting  economic  policies  for  their  own  interest  (Coolidge  &  Rose-
Ackerman, 1997; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Krueger 1993a; Krueger 1993b). Corruption is 
seen by many as one of the principal impediments to the development of an efficient government 
system;  since  it  is  acknowledged  as  a  “symptom  that  something  has  gone  wrong  in  the  
management of the state” (Rose-Ackeman, 1999, p.9).  Even the public acknowledges at large 
that corruption is the greatest obstacle to economic development (Jain, 2001). There is currently 
a stream of empirical assessments  on the causes and consequences of corruption. Though some 
consensus is slowly emerging on the determinants of corruption across countries, a number of 
aspects remain unaddressed. There is lack of consensus on the ability to measure corrupt activity 
and the difficulty of quantifying the impact of institutions on fighting corruption (Billger & Goel, 
2009). The focus of this work is the latter concern. Today policies in the fight against corruption 
espoused by national governments and international organizations happen to be similar across 
countries. Yet the effectiveness of some of these strategies remain ambiguous (Billger & Goel, 
2009).  
The  present  work  contributes  to  the  literature  by focusing  on the  distribution  of  the 
dependent variables (i.e. control of corruption). Corruption-control (hence CC) determinants and 
governments’  efficacy  in  combating  corruption  maybe  different  across  countries  such  that, 
corrupt  and  ‘clean’  countries  respond  differently  to  factors  that  stimulate  the  fight  against 
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corruption. This hypothesis prompts the question of whether there are different determinants of 
combating corruption in high CC countries as compared to least CC ones.  Therefore, if existing 
levels of CC affect how various motives for the fight against  corruption come  into play, then 
findings  of  this  paper  could  have  significant  implications  both  for  the  literature  and  policy 
orientation towards the battle  against  corrupt  practices  in  Africa.   It  follows that,  instead of 
emphasizing  on groups of  countries  with common CC measures,  policy could instead  target 
groups of countries with the same CC characteristics (high, low or average).  The remainder of 
the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data and methodology 
are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. 
We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Existing literature
2.1 Theoretical highlights
Borrowing from Jain (2001), corruption requires three preconditions: discretionary power 
related  to  regulations  (also  see  Rose-Ackeman,  1978),  economic  rents  linked to  power  and, 
sufficiently marginal punishment (Dong et al., 2012). These are the effects of four main theories 
of corruption. (1) Good and misguided governments establish systems that are very rigid. Venal 
bureaucrats  mould  the  rules.  Corruption  diminishes  red-tape  and  if  anything,  improves  the 
allocation  of  resources  (Leff,  1964;  Huntington,  1968).  (2)  Good  and  smart  governments 
establish systems that  are  supposed to be rigid.  Venal  bureaucrats  turn-around the rules and 
regulations.  Corruption reduces bureaucracy and deteriorates allocation efficiency (Laffont & 
Tirole,  1993).   (3)  Greedy  and  smart  governments  make  rules  that  are  very  lax  and  allow 
bureaucrats more discretion than they should normally enjoy. There is absence of red-tape and 
no need for any corrupt activity. Efficient allocation of resources suffers a great deal (Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1993). (4) Good and smart governments establish rules that make  it tempting for the 
bureaucrat to take money and turn-around the rules. A bureaucrat introduces red-tape in a bid to 
bend the rules in a way that protects him/her. Corruption and red-tape move hand in hand. 
According to Billger & Goel (2009), the theoretical basis for corruption studies also draw 
from the larger  literature on the determinants  of criminal  activity,  where rational  individuals 
(bribe-givers, bribe-takers …etc) weigh the relative benefits and costs of criminal (corrupt) acts 
(Becker,  1968).  Potential  benefits  of  corruption  could  include  disproportionate  favors  that 
monopolist bureaucrats could hand-out (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) or they may involve cutting 
(accelerating)  bureaucratic  red-tape  (Guriev,  2004).  The  differential  levels  of  impatience 
(discount rates) across economic agents induce some to accept/offer bribes and determine the 
size  of  the  bribes.  Potential  costs  of   indulging  in  corrupt  activity  include  the  cost  of 
apprehension and punishment. Surviving literature does however allow for the possibility that 
monitoring agencies could themselves be corrupt (Banerjee, 1997).
2.2 Types and levels of corruption: how the stakes involved can influence governance
Based on the context of this paper, it is irrelevant to center the debate on the issue of 
whether corruption is inherently good or bad. It is more useful to cite which types of corruption 
have the most corrosive effect on social/economic stability (development). Political leadership 
plays  a  crucial  role  in  promoting/discouraging  (governing)  corrupt  activities.  To  effectively 
shape this role, it is imperative to move beyond the subjective and qualitative analyses which 
describe corruption as a mere moral failing of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Thus, it 
is more useful to consider it as a politico-economic phenomenon. 
Corrupt activities are prevalent to some degree in all societies. In recent years however, 
political  scientists  have  aggressively  searched  to  understand  the  reason  some  nations  and 
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societies are clearly more vulnerable to abusive political and economic opportunism than others. 
In  response  they  have  suggested  a  number  of  typologies  that  indicate  links  between  the 
incidences  of  corruption  and specific  stages  of  political,  economic  and social  developments 
(Kpundeh, 1998). With respect to some authors, the types and amounts of corruption vary in 
accordance with a number of factors affecting the relationship between government and civil 
society (Johnston, 1982). For the purpose of explicitly underlining the objective of our study, it 
is  useful  to  categorize  the  phenomenon  into  three  frameworks:  incidental,  systematic  and 
systemic  corruption,  as  summarized  in  Table  1  (consistent  with   Kpundeh  (1998)).  Firstly, 
Incidental corruption  is typical of petty bribery and involves opportunistic individuals or small 
groups.  Within  this  framework,  corruption  is  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  High-level 
private  sector  actors  and  senior  officials  are  seldom  disturbed  by  such  theft.  Secondly, 
Systematic corruption is organized, not necessarily pervasive or institutionalized  but recurrent. 
It usually involves large gains which are for the most part subject to popular scandals. Whereas it 
is entrenched and functions with a large  number of officials, intermediaries and entrepreneurs, 
this form of corruption originates from  high-level civil servants that recognize and exploit the 
illegal ventures and opportunities in government departments and agencies. Hence, this practice 
is the direct violation of the regulation and rule of law. Thirdly, Systemic corruption is pervasive, 
institutionalized (perhaps condoned but not necessarily approved), and built into the economic 
and political institutions. It occurs and flourishes in circumstances where public sector wages fall 
below  a   living  threshold.  In  contrast  to  systematic  corruption,  it  involves  all  levels  of 
employment.
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Table 1: A Simplified Typology of Corruption
Type Main Actors Mode
Incidental 
Petty officials, interested 
officials and opportunistic 
individuals. 
Small size embezzlement and misappropriation, 
bribes, favoritism and discrimination. 
Systematic 
Public officials, politicians, 
representatives of donor and 
recipient countries, 
bureaucratic elites, business 
men and middle men.
Bribery and kickbacks, collusion to defraud the 
public, large-scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation through public tender and 
disposal of public property, economic privileges 
accorded to special interests, large political 
donations and bribes. 
Systemic 
Bureaucratic elites, politicians, 
business men and white-collar 
workers. 
Large-scale embezzlement through ‘ghost 
worker’ on government pay roll, embezzling 
government funds through false procurement-
payment for nonexistent goods, large scale 
disbursement of public property to special and 
privileged interest under the pretext of ‘national 
interest’, favoritism and discrimination exercised 
in favor of ruling parties in exchange for political 
contributions. 
Source: Kpundeh (1998)
Therefore from a theoretical standpoint the fight against corruption could be incidental, 
systematic  or  systemic.  However  from a  practical  view,  legislation  against  corruption  often 
encompasses  the  three  types.  Our  paper  focuses  indifferently  on  the  three  categories  of 
corruption.  This  is  because,  where  systemic  corruption  is  present,  systematic  and incidental 
corruption are already prevalent; which is the case of most African countries. 
2.3 Governance and fight against corruption in Africa
Corruption in most African countries has become one of the greatest challenges to leaders 
and citizens, threatening to undermine effective governmental financial management (Isa, 2009). 
It  is  also a  menace to both economic development  and the process of establishing  enduring 
democracy in  the  African  continent.   A heated  debate  has  raged on for  years  over  Africa’s 
economic woes. Besides the obvious problems of warfare, drought and disease, the usual suspect 
is economic policy (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Corruption remains one of the most 
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daunting  challenges  for majority  of   African countries.  As supported by several  studies  and 
surveys, it is a major obstacle to economic progress, social welfare, service delivery and good 
governance in the continent. The literature on African corruption will be tackled in four strands: 
causes, consequence, measures in the fight against the scourge and positioning of the paper in 
light of the first three strands. 
In  the  first  strand,  Africa’s  widespread  corruption  has  roots  that  are  worth  critically 
reflecting on, if controlling and aggressively eliminating it is to be successful. Much has been 
documented  on the  causes  of  corruption  in  this  continent  (Callaghy,  1986;  Nukunya,  1992; 
Groenendijk, 1997; Waligo, 1999; Osei, 1999; Rossouw, 1999). These scholars have traced the 
root causes of corruption in Africa to: prevalence of dictatorial rules, monetized or materialized 
economies,  poor  economic  and  educational  empowerment  of  the  citizenry,  “belly  politics”, 
emphasis  on  the  public  sector  as  the  ‘prime  driver’  of  economic  development,  absence  of 
national ethical and moral values, deterioration of true patriotism, inter alia. According to the 
2009 African Governance Report, corruption seems to have worsened in many Africa countries 
(UNECA,  2009).  Most  governance  institutions:  executive,  legislative,  judiciary  and  public 
service  are  deemed  to  be  corrupt.  In  accordance  with  the  report,  poor  governance,  lack  of 
accountability  and transparency,  low level  of  democratic  culture  and tradition,  deficiency in 
citizen participation, lack of clear regulations, low level of institutional control, extreme poverty 
and inequality could be cited as major causes of corruption. Civil society is not even immune to 
the scourge. In addition, a blurred distinction between private and public interests, inadequate 
accounting  and  auditing,  over  regulated  bureaucracy  and  deterioration  of  acceptable  moral 
standards are all part of the problem. 
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On the consequences of corruption in the second strand, Isa (2009) postulates that,  the 
most serious obstacle to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 
African  continent  is  corruption.  Accordingly,  there  are  many  branches  or  dimensions  of 
corruption in African countries that have extended owing to the absence of stringent measures in 
practice for effective prevention and control. Auyo (1998) underlines some of them to include: 
abuse of power,  ill-treatment  of subordinates and indecent  treatment  of people’s needs, self-
awards  of  public  contracts,  malicious  withdrawal  or  ‘under-carpeting’  of  personnel  files, 
fraudulent  distortion  of  facts  and figures,  nepotism,  unnecessary delay of  actions  on certain 
demands, financial misappropriation and embezzlement, ghost worker systems, over-invoicing, 
transfer of public funds to private accounts, over-pricing of contracts, inter alia. Borrowing from 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2009, p.1), it is estimated that in 
2004, the continent lost more than $148 billion to corruption; approximately 25% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). More so, the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2006, p.7) suggests 
that 50% of tax revenue and $30 billion in aid for Africa ends up in corrupt hands. With respect  
to the UNECA (2005), corruption ranked as one of the three most serious national  problems 
confronting African countries, the other two being poverty and unemployment. 
In the third strand, we discuss measures that are being adopted to off-root the causes and 
mitigate the consequences of corruption. Relying on documented facts and research findings, Isa 
(2009) advocates that whistle blowing should be encouraged by using adequate laws to protect 
the whistle blowers and by providing them with incentives in the form of payment of an agreed 
percentage of any amount recovered from fraudulent officers through the efforts of the whistle 
blowers.  Many analysts  are  of  the  opinion  that,  ‘piecemeal  approaches  may  never  work  in 
comparison to comprehensive approaches’. Accordingly, the interrelationships between business 
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and government, between business and civil society institutions (especially political groups in 
society) spell out the manner in which political economy hinders efforts to mitigate corruption. 
These relationships are particularly relevant in societies where self-regulation and government 
regulatory efforts are insufficient. Under these circumstances, business on its own or civil society 
on its own or government on its own will continue to be ineffective in dealing with corruption.  
Hence, the need to move forward with collective actions. On the international front, Okada & 
Samreth  (2012)  have  recently  suggested,  foreign-aid  as  a  cure  to  corruption  in  developing 
countries.  Bearing  in  mind,  this  finding  could  have  an  important  influence  on  policy  and 
academics debates, Asongu (2012a) has partially negated the Okada and Samreth  conclusion in 
the  context  of  Africa.  Using  updated  data  (1996-2010)  from  52  African  countries,  he  has 
provided  robust  evidence  of  a  positive  aid-corruption  nexus  and  concluded:  development 
assistance  fuels  (mitigates)  corruption  (the  control  of  corruption)  in  the  African  continent. 
Hence, the Okada & Samreth finding for developing countries may not be relevant for Africa. 
The Asongu (2012a) stance has been extended to other dynamics of political  economy: inter 
alia, government effectiveness, voice & accountability, political stability, rule of law, regulation 
quality (Asongu, 2012b). 
Many African  countries  have  adopted  policy  measures,  enacted  laws  and established 
institutions in attempts to address the issue. Still corruption continues to be a lingering concern 
in governance and economic life. In light of the above, extending the Okada & Samreth (2012) 
and Asongu (2012a) debate by integrating other dynamics into the equation could provide policy 
makers with the much needed guidance on how to fight the scourge. In this paper we attempt to 
explain determinants in the fight against corruption. Its contribution to the literature is threefold. 
(1) By focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable, we assess if corrupt and ‘clean’ 
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countries respond differently to factors that deter corrupt activity. Unlike mainstream literature, 
we are able to provide an assessment of CC conditional on the distribution of CC. (2) The use of 
much recent data (2002-2010) based on majority (46) of African countries provides results with 
inclusive  and  updated  policy  implications.  (3)  Disaggregation  of  the  dataset  into  four 
homogenous  panels,  reflecting   income-levels  (low, middle,  lower-middle and upper-middle) 
could provide more targeted policy implications.               
Given  both  the  herculean  task  of  measuring  the  true  level  of  corruption  and  the 
substantial  effort  required in  creating  another  index (which could be no better  than existing 
indices), two research avenues have been proposed (Billger & Goel, 2009).  The first consists of 
examining additional determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2000) whereas  the second entails 
employing different estimation techniques (McAdam & Rummel, 2004). The latter strategy is 
the  object  of  this  paper.  This  approach  allows  us  to  capture  the  subtle  differences  in  the 
determinants of CC across ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ countries. Therefore, an assessment throughout the 
conditional distribution of the fight against corruption could substantially add to the extant body 
of knowledge in the corruption-development nexus. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We  examine  a  panel  of  46  countries  with  updated  data  (2002-2010)  from  African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB). The limitation to 46 (of the 54 existing 
African countries) is due to constraints in data availability. To allow for more options in policy 
implications,  the dataset  is  disaggregated  into income-levels  (low, middle,  lower-middle  and 
upper-middle). The endogenous variable is the ‘control of corruption’ indicator; consistent with 
the corruption literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2012abc). In 
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this  paper  we  use  five  control  variables:  level  of  economic  prosperity,  population  growth, 
democracy,  regulation quality and government  effectiveness.  These variables have been used 
collectively or  separately in  the corruption literature (Bardhan,  1997; Treisman,  2000;  Jain, 
2001; Aidt, 2003; Lambdorff, 2006;  Billger & Goel, 2009). A significant bulk of research has 
shown that a politico-economic approach stressing the importance of institutions is a powerful 
tool in understanding corruption (Abed & Gupta, 2002; Bradhan,1997; Rose-Ackerman,1997). 
Electoral rules and structures substantially influence the corruption level (Kunicova & Rose-
Ackeman,  2005) and countries  tend to  achieve an equilibrium position that  is  driven by the 
balance of political forces and institutions (Bird et al., 2006; Bird et al., 2008).   Beyond these 
empirical  bases  in  the  choice  of  government-quality  control  variables,  the  theoretical 
underpinnings of the corruption literature point to the central role of good-governance  in the 
fight against the scourge. In plainer terms, selection of variables is fully justified by theoretical 
and empirical  literature.  Corresponding summary statistics  (Appendix 1),  correlation analysis 
(Appendix 2), variable definitions (Appendix 3) and presentation of countries (Appendix 4) are 
provided in the appendices. 
Apart  from   good-governance  determinants,  borrowing  from  Billger  &  Goel  (2009, 
p.300),  economic  prosperity  and  democracy  are  standard  determinants  of  CC.  Economic 
prosperity  in  the  literature  (Serra,  2006)  is  observed  to  decrease  corruption  because  from 
common-sense  to  some  extent  economic  theory  bribe-takers  and  bribe-givers  are  lower  in 
wealthier nations, as the propensity to take bribe decreases when growth in national income is 
equitably distributed. Political competition entrenched in democracy is more likely to exert an 
appealing effect on the fight against corruption  because elected officials are required to account 
for  policies  and are sanctioned by the  electorate  if  election  promises  are  not  kept.  A major 
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election promise in majority of  African countries is the fight against corruption. Government 
quality  enshrined  in  regulation  quality,  government  effectiveness,   rule  of  law,  voice  & 
accountability  and  political  stability  (no  violence)  ensure  greater  economic  and  political 
freedoms which lead to less corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Goel & Nelson, 2005). The size of 
the  population  is  also  likely  to  affect  corruption,  especially  if  demographic  change  is 
accompanied  with  a  higher  degree  of  urbanization  (Billger  &  Goel,  2009).  A  greater 
concentration  of  the  population  in  urban  areas  is  likely  to  increase  their  discount  rates  and 
provide greater  opportunities  for interactions  between potential  bribe-takers  and bribe-givers. 
Conversely, a highly concentrated urban population could indicate a greater chance of informal 
corruption oversight (Billger & Goel, 2009). 
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from  Billger  &  Goel  (2009),  to  determine  whether  existing  levels  of  CC 
affect how various determinants in the battle against corruption come into play, we use quantile 
regression.  This  approach  enables  us  to  investigate  if  the  relationship  between  CC and  the 
exogenous variables  differ throughout the distribution of the dependent  variable  (Koenker & 
Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on the determinants of corruption are based on estimation by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), which report parameter estimates at the conditional mean of corruption. 
Whereas mean effects are certainly important, this study expands such findings using quantile 
regression. In addition, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS regression is that the error 
term and the dependent variable are normally distributed. However, quantile regression does not 
require a normally distributed disturbance term. Thus, based on this estimation technique we are 
able  to  carefully  assess  the  determinants  of  CC throughout  the conditional  distribution  with 
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particular emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption. Quantile regression (hence QR) 
yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) and has been relevant in recent corruption literature (Billger 
& Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). The θ th quantile estimator of the endogenous variable 
is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
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Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example the 10th or 90th 
quantiles  (with  θ =0.10  or  0.90  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is :
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are derived for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to  βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at  the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable. For the model in Eq. (2), the 
dependent  variable  iy  is  the  CC indicator  while  ix  contains  a  constant  term,  GDP growth, 
population growth, democracy, regulation quality and  government effectiveness. The quantile 
estimation approach is more robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers when the 
distribution of the dependent variable is a highly non-normal pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012). 
We also report findings for Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) which should correspond to those 
of the 0.5th  quantile  for robustness purpose.  
14
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Low and Middle income countries 
The findings presented in Table 2 entail OLS, LAD and QR estimates. While Panel A 
presents results for Low income countries, findings for Middle income countries are captured by 
Panel B.  OLS estimates provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of 
LAD and  separate  quantiles  in  the  conditional  distributions  of  the  endogenous  variable.  In 
interpreting the signs of estimated coefficients,  note should be taken of the fact that smaller 
values (in conditional distributions) of the endogenous  variable denote less  CC. 
The following could be established from the findings. (1) In Panel A,  OLS regressions 
show that while economic prosperity mitigates the control of corruption, population growth and 
good-governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness) improve it. Corresponding 
Panel B OLS results differ from those of Panel A in one dimension: population growth decreases 
the fight against corruption. It follows that based on OLS, population growth is a tool for the 
fight  against  corruption  only in  Low income countries.  (2)  Based on QR, in  both Low and 
Middle income countries, economic prosperity reduces incentives to CC with a higher magnitude 
at  higher  quantiles:  countries  that  are  already  taking  the  corruption  fight  seriously.  (3)  As 
concerns QR  estimates on population growth, while for Low income countries (hence LICs) the 
magnitude of the positive effect of population growth on CC increases in tandem with incentives 
to  fight  corruption,  for  Middle  income  countries  (hence  MICs),  the  negative  effect  of 
demographic change on CC has no definite pattern (wave-like effect across the distribution). (4) 
Whereas  democracy  diminishes  CC  in  LICs  (with  the  effect  only  significant  at  the  0.90th 
quantile), the positive effect of democracy on CC in MICs is consistently significant across the 
conditional  distribution  (though  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  is  wave-like).  (5)  Government 
effectiveness  in  either  LICs  or  MICs  improves  CC with  the  magnitude  increasing  with  the 
15
distribution: that is as the battle against corruption increases. (6) Regulation quality ameliorates 
CC in either LICs or MICs with a quasi-normal distribution with peaks at the 0.50th and 0.25th 
quantiles  for  LICs  and  MICs  respectively.  (7)  The  LAD  findings  correspond to  the  0.50th 
quantile estimates across specifications. 
Table 2: Corruption-Control: Low and Middle income countries  
Panel A: Low Income Countries (28)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.647*** -0.198 -0.512*** -0.351*** -0.198* -0.438*** -0.473***
(0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.007* -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009
(0.073) (0.469) (0.386) (0.214) (0.369) (0.149) (0.237)
Population growth 0.100*** -0.048 -0.091*** -0.086*** -0.048 0.094*** 0.253***
(0.002) (0.331) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.006) (0.000)
Democracy 0.003 0.002 -0.0008 0.000 0.002 0.009 -0.024**
(0.627) (0.731) (0.831) (0.993) (0.670) (0.152) (0.033)
Regulation  Quality 0.398*** 0.552*** 0.423*** 0.480*** 0.552*** 0.452*** 0.365***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  252 252 252 252 252 252 252
Specification 2
Constant -0.450*** -0.286*** -0.888*** -0.567*** -0.286*** -0.293** -0.348***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.008** -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007** -0.008 -0.010***
(0.026) (0.125) (0.534) (0.338) (0.024) (0.102) (0.000)
Population growth 0.143*** 0.091** 0.095* 0.072** 0.091*** 0.170*** 0.251***
(0.000) (0.017) (0.050) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009***
(0.660) (0.728) (0.446) (0.857) (0.674) (0.686) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 0.685*** 0.731*** 0.513*** 0.613*** 0.731*** 0.737*** 0.699***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 252
Panel B: Middle Income Countries (18)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.213*** 0.165* -0.076*** 0.088** 0.165** 0.394*** 0.572***
(0.001) (0.055) (0.007) (0.040) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009* -0.002
(0.355) (0.262) (0.529) (0.645) (0.299) (0.089) (0.539)
Population growth -0.251*** -0.226*** -0.225*** -0.249*** -0.226*** -0.265*** -0.294***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000°
Democracy 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.048*** 0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.660*** 0.699*** 0.709*** 0.713*** 0.699*** 0.691*** 0.641***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Specification 2
Constant 0.126** 0.205*** -0.063 -0.038 0.205*** 0.328*** 0.564***
(0.027) (0.002) (0.178) (0.507) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.008** -0.007** -0.001 -0.004 -0.007* -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.714) (0.216) (0.082) (0.033) (0.000)
Population growth -0.140*** -0.209*** -0.252*** -0.166*** -0.209*** -0.149*** -0.169***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Democracy 0.016*** 0.009 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.009 0.017** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.220) (0.000) (0.009) (0.149) (0.030) (0.015)
Government Effectiveness 0.765*** 0.704*** 0.606*** 0.692*** 0.704*** 0.807*** 0.910***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation.  
LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. 
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4.2  Lower middle income and Upper middle income countries 
Table  3  below  presents  results  for  Lower  Middle  Income  (LMI)  and  Upper  Middle 
Income (UMI) countries in OLS, LAD and QR estimates. Whereas Panel A presents results for 
LMI countries, Panel B depicts findings for their  UMI counterparts. OLS estimates provide a 
baseline of mean effects and we compare the estimates of LAD and separate quantiles in the 
conditional distributions of the endogenous variable. In the comparative analysis, smaller values 
(in conditional distributions) of the endogenous  variable denote less CC.
The following could be established with respect to findings in Table 3. (1) For both Panel 
A and Panel B, OLS regressions show that, while economic prosperity and population growth 
decrease  CC,  government  quality  dynamics  (democracy,  regulation  quality  and  government 
effectiveness) improve it. (2) Based on QR in both LMI and UMI countries, economic prosperity 
reduces incentives to CC with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already 
taking the corruption fight seriously. (3) Population growth is detrimental to CC, however the 
pattern of the distribution is not definite (wave-like effect across the distribution). (4) Broadly, 
democracy ameliorates CC both in UMI and LMI countries with a greater magnitude at higher 
quantiles:  countries with existing high CC levels. (5) Government effectiveness in either LMI or 
UMI countries improve CC with the magnitude increasing with  the conditional distribution up 
to  a  certain  level  (0.50th quantile  for  LMI  countries   and  0.75th for  UMI  countries)  before 
adopting a wave-like distribution (for LMI countries) or decreasing (for UMI countries). (6) The 
positive effect of regulation quality on CC is somewhat antagonistic: while for LMI countries it 
decreases to the 0.50th quantile before increasing, for UMI countries it increases to the 0.25th 
quantile before dropping progressively.  (7) The LAD  findings correspond to the 0.50th quantile 
estimates across specifications.
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Table 3: Corruption-Control: Lower middle and Upper middle income countries 
Lower Middle Income Countries (10)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.285*** 0.207** 0.055 0.098* 0.207*** 0.407*** 0.621***
(0.000) (0.049) (0.539) (0.053) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.012* -0.014***
(0.287) (0.443) (0.982) (0.485) (0.462) (0.063) (0.000)
Population growth -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.262*** -0.244*** -0.265*** -0.274*** -0.263***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.706*** 0.645*** 0.750*** 0.705*** 0.645*** 0.694*** 0.781***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 92 90
Specification 2
Constant 0.191*** 0.235*** 0.105 0.056*** 0.235*** 0.316** 0.403***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.013** -0.011 -0.007 -0.009*** -0.011** -0.015 -0.024***
(0.011) (0.133) (0.365) (0.000) (0.014) (0.198) (0.005)
Population growth -0.221*** -0.257*** -0.334*** -0.231*** -0.257*** -0.239*** -0.182***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Democracy 0.022*** 0.017* 0.003 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.024** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.058) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 0.620*** 0.628*** 0.544*** 0.564*** 0.628*** 0.580*** 0.589***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Upper Middle Income Countries (8)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.082 -0.301 -0.227** -0.204 -0.301 -0.211* -0.156
(0.930) (0.468) (0.015) (0.207) (0.456) (0.063) (0.725)
Economic Prosperity -0.005 -0.011 0.0007 0.000 -0.011 -0.022*** -0.000
(0.452) (0.399) (0.759) (0.989) (0.268) (0.000) (0.944)
Population growth -0.104 0.019 -0.203*** -0.168** 0.019 -0.010 -0.063
(0.349) (0.924) (0.000) (0.019) (0.914) (0.823) (0.743)
Democracy 0.046* 0.048 0.038*** 0.036** 0.048 0.091*** 0.126***
(0.057) (0.217) (0.000) (0.019) (0.213) (0.000) (0.003)
Regulation  Quality 0.656*** 0.680*** 0.637*** 0.700*** 0.680*** 0.402*** 0.399**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Specification 2
Constant 0.042 0.124 -0.122 -0.022 0.124 0.204* 0.333***
(0.813) (0.595) (0.687) (0.884) (0.430) (0.096) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.006 -0.008 -0.0005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.004 -0.008***
(0.172) (0.131) (0.945) (0.204) (0.052) (0.203) (0.000)
Population growth 0.096 0.111 -0.177 0.013 0.111 0.132** 0.080***
(0.241) (0.289) (0.208) (0.845) (0.126) (0.021) (0.004)
Democracy -0.032 -0.055* 0.014 -0.025 -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.030***
(0.106) (0.084) (0.662) (0.146) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 1.159*** 1.232*** 0.720*** 1.026*** 1.232*** 1.279*** 1.210***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of  Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation.  
LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
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4.3  Discussion, policy implications and limitations
4.3.1  What do wealth  effects tell us?  
Two important factors that will play in Africa’s future are population growth and good-
governance.  Accelerating demographic change remains  an important  concern in Africa today 
with  the continent’s  emergence  as  one with the  highest  demographic  growth rates,  with the 
population projected to double by 2036 and represent 20% of the World by 2050 (Asongu & 
Jingwa, 2012). The recent geopolitical landscape of the African continent, marked by the Arab-
Spring has centered around the perils of authoritarian regimes (Asongu, 2012d). Thus population 
growth,  democratization  and the  fight  against  corruption constitute  serious  challenges  to  the 
continent’s ability to emerge from poverty. 
Our investigation on the incidence of wealth-effects in the fight against corruption when 
existing corruption-control levels matter has yielded the following broad findings.  (1) Based on 
OLS and QR estimates, population growth is a tool for the fight against corruption only in Low 
income countries  with a higher magnitude  in higher  quantiles.  This suggests that,  very poor 
countries  experiencing faster  population  growth rates  could use this  instrument  positively in 
improving  good-governance.   More  so,   LICs  already  taking  the  fight  against  corruption 
seriously  will  benefit  more  from this  tool  than  their  counterparts  still  lax  in  combating  the 
scourge. (2) Population growth in MICs significantly mitigates the fight against corruption; this 
is consistent with UMI as well as LMI countries. This implies, in wealthier African countries 
population growth is accompanied with an increase in ‘bribe-taker bribe-giver interactions’ as 
well  as  a  decrease  in  corruption  oversight.  (3)  Democracy  decreases  CC  in  LICs,  with  a 
significant effect at the highest quantile. In substance, it implies democratization in LICs does 
not come along with institutions that effectively combat  corruption.  This may in part  be the 
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result of relative lack of financial means to set-up appropriate institutions. (4) Democratization is 
a tool in the fight against corruption only in MICs, with significant effects across specifications 
and distributions for the most part. This confirms the thesis that democracy requires a certain 
threshold in national  economic prosperity for effectiveness (Asongu, 2011). 
4.3.2 Further discussion and  limitations 
  
The battle against corruption remains an important priority in policy making bodies in the 
African continent. Our findings suggest that OLS estimates correspond (stricto-sensu) at times to 
just a specific quantile of the conditional distribution. This difference implies that some policies 
based on OLS should be reconsidered, especially across the best and worst fighters of corruption. 
Thus, our findings  demonstrate that blanket CC policies are unlikely to succeed equally across 
countries  with   different  income-levels  and   political-wills  in  the  fight  against  corruption. 
Success of CC policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of CC and income-bracket 
as we have elucidated above. To be effective, CC initiatives should be tailored differently across 
the   best  and worst   corruption-fighting  countries  especially  with respect  to  democracy and 
population growth.
A great many African countries already have well established   CC policies, yet their 
implementation and enforcement is another issue and remains a matter of ‘political will’. The 
following  are  some  aspects  that  need  to  be  accounted  for  if  reform  and  policies  we  have 
proposed are to yield fruits. (1) The battle against corruption cannot be a ‘one man show’ and 
relegated  uniquely to political  leadership.  Anti-corruption endeavors are  effective if  they are 
inclusive,  systematic  and  structured;  that  is  to  say,  integrating  all  institutions  and  policies 
(investigation, prosecution, research and prevention). Such institutionalization develops a forum 
of mutually reinforcing ‘horizontal accountability’ which prevents reforms from being perceived 
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as  partisan  concerns  or  ‘witch  hunts’.  (2)  Administrations  could  establish  public  confidence 
through regular updates  in press conferences that outline strides that are being made towards 
mitigating wrongdoing, increasing accountability and transparency. (3) The independence of the 
anti-corruption body set-up by the powers that be is also paramount for the success of reform 
strategies.  In  Hong-Kong and Singapore  for  instance,  the  effectiveness  and  success  of  anti-
corruption establishments  are directly linked to their  degree of autonomy.  If the independent 
entities  are  answerable  to  parliament  instead  of  the  head  of  state,  this  could  improve  their 
effectiveness (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 105).
The  findings  in  this  paper  are  not  directly  comparable  with  those  in  the  corruption 
literature  because  we have employed  two novelties:  (1)  assessing how to combat  corruption 
throughout the conditional of corruption in the presence of wealth effects and; (2) using the 
determinants  that  represent  significant  challenges  to  long-term  development  in  the  African 
continent.  Hence,  this  positioning  does  not  enable  us  to  conclude  as  to   if,  a  given  factor 
absolutely increases or reduces the incidence of corruption (like in the Okada  & Samreth (2012) 
and Asongu (2012ab)  debate).  We have cut  adrift  this  debate  by presenting  corruption  as  a 
multidimensional and complex issue, that can only be properly understood if many dynamics are 
taken into account. Such dynamics in our case constitute the novelties highlighted in the first 
sentence of this paragraph. 
An important limitation to take into account is that, studies of this kind depend quite a lot 
on the integrity of the proxy for CC obtained from perception-based measures. Thus, omitted 
variables  and  media-effect  may  significantly  influence  perceptions  on  the  fight  against 
corruption in a given country. However, as far as we know there are no better indicators  of CC 
than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank.  Also, while this study is 
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useful as an education or learning tool for students and practitioners, it has some limited policy 
applicability.  In fact,  some of the policy variables  that  affect  corruption (such as population 
growth)  are  of little  use for  short-term policy change (regarding corruption control).  Hence, 
change in population policy is not something any country can do overnight for the effectiveness 
of corruption-control.  While  the shortcoming of immediate  policy application is  evident,  the 
study holds some ground with respect to the manner in which some distant challenges would 
play-out in the fight against corruption if the wealth of nations is taken into account. 
5. Conclusion 
Why  are  some  nations  more  effective  at  battling  corruption  than  others?  Are  there 
different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth 
effects  play-out  when  existing  corruption-control  levels  matter  in  the  corruption  battle?  To 
investigate these concerns we have examined the determinants of corruption-control throughout 
the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings have 
been established. (1) Based on OLS and QR, population growth is a tool in the fight against  
corruption  only  in  Low  income  countries  with  a  higher  magnitude  at  higher  quantiles.  (2) 
Population  growth  in  Middle  income  countries  significantly  mitigates  the  fight  against 
corruption;  this  is  consistent  with  Upper  as  well  as  Lower  middle  income  countries.  (3) 
Democracy decreases corruption-control in Low income countries, with a significant effect at the 
highest quantile.  (4) Democratization is a tool in the fight against  corruption only in Middle 
income countries,  with significant  effects  across specifications  and distributions for the most 
part.
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As  a  policy  implication, blanket  corruption-control  policies  are  unlikely  to  succeed 
equally across countries with  different income-levels and  political  wills in the fight against 
corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels 
of  corruption-control  and  income-bracket  as  we  have  elucidated  above.  It  follows  that 
corruption-control initiatives should be tailored differently across the  best and worst  corruption-
fighting countries especially with respect to democracy and population growth. Caveats of the 
study have been discussed. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variable Control of Corruption -0.612 0.561 -1.694 1.086 414
Independent Variables 
Economic  Prosperity 4.602 5.254 -31.30 37.99 414
Population Growth 2.262 0.815 -0.143 4.477 414
Democracy 2.903 3.896 -8.000 10.000 414
Regulation Quality -0.651 0.617 -2.394 0.905 414
Government Effectiveness -0.703 0.603 -1.774 0.807 414
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
CC RQ RL GE V& A PolS Demo GDPg Popg
1.000 0.753 0.867 0.865 0.628 0.648 0.452 -0.043 -0.292 CC
1.000 0.857 0.865 0.751 0.624 0.466 0.109 -0.224 RQ
1.000 0.907 0.700 0.756 0.510 0.063 -0.282 RL
1.000 0.699 0.644 0.483 0.036 -0.396 GE
1.000 0.582 0.750 0.050 -0.100 V& A
1.000 0.492 0.070 -0.194 PolS
1.000 0.073 -0.094 Demo
1.000 0.279 GDPg
1.000 Popg
CC: Control of Corruption. RQ: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GE:Government Effectiveness.  V& A: Voice & Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability. Demo: Democracy. GDPg: GDP Growth. Popg: Population Growth
  
Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Source
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Government Effectiveness GE Government Effectiveness (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank (WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank (WDI)
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank (WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. 
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
17
French Civil-Law  Algeria,  Angola,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo  Republic,  Congo 
Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  Eritrea,  Equatorial 
Guinea,  Ivory Coast,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia.
29
Religions Christianity 
Angola, Benin ,Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, Ivory 
Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  Gabon,  Ghana, 
Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
30
Islam Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Libya,   Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia.
16
Income 
Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti, 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  The Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Rwanda,   Sierra  Leone,  Togo,  Uganda,  Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
28
Middle Income Algeria,  Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya,  Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
18
Lower Middle Income Angola,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast,  Lesotho,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, South Africa. 
8
Num: number of countries 
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